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EVOLUTIONARY  GAMES IN ECONOMICS 
BY DANIEL  FRIEDMAN 1 
Evolutionary  games  are  introduced  as  models  for  repeated  anonymous  strategic 
interaction. The basic idea is that actions (or behaviors) which are more "fit," given the 
current distribution of  behaviors, tend  over  time  to  displace  less  fit behaviors.  Simple 
numerical examples motivate the key concepts of fitness function and compatible dynam- 
ics, and illustrate the relation to previous biological models. Cone fields are introduced to 
characterize  the  continuous-time  dynamical processes  compatible  with  a  given  fitness 
function. The analysis focuses on dynamic steady state equilibria and their relation to the 
static equilibria known as NE (Nash equilibrium) and ESS (evolutionary stable state). For 
large classes of dynamics it is shown that all stable dynamic steady states are NE and that 
all NE  are dynamic steady states. The biologists' ESS condition is less closely related to 
the dynamic equilibria. The paper concludes with a brief survey of economic applications. 
KEYWORDS:  Evolutionary games, evolutionary stable strategies, cone field dynamics. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
IN  AN  EVOLUTIONARY GAME each  individual chooses  among alternative actions 
or behaviors whose payoff or fitness depends on the choices of others. Over time 
the distribution of observed behavior in a population evolves, as fitter strategies 
become  more prevalent. The  very prevalence  of  a behavior can make  it (and 
other behaviors) more fit or less fit, so dynamics can be quite complex. One can 
ask which behaviors become  extinct and which survive over time, whether the 
system approaches some stable steady-state, and so forth. 
The  present  paper has two goals. The  first is to propose  a tractable frame- 
work for evolutionary games which incorporates the relevant previous work by 
John  Maynard Smith  and  his  collaborators  in  biology  and  mathematics,  but 
which  is  suitable  for  economic  applications.  The  second  goal  is  to  derive 
substantive results on the relation between  evolutionary steady states and static 
equilibria of the payoff or fitness function. Meeting  these  goals should encour- 
age economists to employ evolutionary models in serious applied work. 
The biologists emphasize pairwise interactions of individuals drawn randomly 
from  a  single  population  and  center  their  analysis  on  a  static  equilibrium 
concept known as ESS, for "evolutionarily stable" strategy or state. The inequal- 
ities  defining ESS  are intended  to  capture the  intuition  of  an  "uninvadable" 
state  of  the  population:  if the  population  is in an ESS  then  a small minority 
employing  any  deviant  behavior  (an  "invasion  of  mutants")  will  eventually 
disappear under natural selection.  Mathematicians, beginning with Taylor and 
1 My thanks to audiences at UCLA and the Santa Fe Institute for useful suggestions. I especially 
wish to thank Jack Hirshleifer for getting me to think about this topic, for introducing me to the 
literature, and for many stimulating exchanges of views. I also wish to thank Nirvikar Singh, John 
Riley,  and Eric Rasmusen  for their constructive comments,  Joel  Yellin  for useful  discussions on 
technique,  and a co-editor  and two anonymous referees  for generous  editorial  advice. The  usual 
caveat shields them all. 
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Jonker  (1978), confirmed  that ESS was sufficient  (although  not necessary)  for 
stability  under natural  selection dynamics. 
Economists  and other social scientists  can, I believe, usefully  employ  many  of 
the ideas introduced  by the biologists,  but the biologists'  formal  structure  needs 
to be  adapted and extended. A  fundamental  point is that biologists almost 
always  deal with the genetic mechanism  of natural  selection. This mechanism 
admits  a simple, canonical  dynamical  representation,  which I refer to below as 
the Malthusian  dynamic.2  For economists  the social  mechanisms  of learning  and 
imitation are usually more important than the genetic mechanism.  A  wide 
variety  of learning  and imitation  processes are conceivable  and the appropriate 
dynamical  representation  seems to be highly  context-dependent.  To deal com- 
pactly with a diverse set of possible dynamics  my formal analysis  employs the 
device of cone fields, introduced  by Smale (1976). It is not my purpose to 
propose any general  theory  of learning,  so I rely on examples  and references  to 
existing literature to  suggest specific dynamical  processes which may be  of 
interest. 
Two other, less fundamental  extensions  are worth noting briefly.  Most of the 
existing  biological  models consider  the evolution  of a single species rather  than 
the coevolution  of several  distinct  species. My basic model, by contrast,  features 
interactions of  several strategically  distinct populations, so  as to  represent 
economic relationships  between buyers and sellers, or between residents in 
different  jurisdictions,  etc. Most biological  models have (bi)linear  specifications 
and are interpreted  in terms  of interactions  between randomly  matched  individ- 
uals. By contrast,  my basic model allows  some nonlinearities  to capture  possible 
interactions  with a whole population,  a possibility  biologists  refer to as "playing 
the field." 
Evolutionary  games as presented  here are quite distinct  from supergames  and 
from differential  games, even though all three examine the dynamics  of re- 
peated strategic  interaction.  Differential  games allow payoffs  to depend on the 
time paths of all individual  players' actions, and supergames  allow strategies 
defined on time paths even though current payoffs depend only on current 
actions.  Such intertemporal  strategies  and payoffs  are ruled out in evolutionary 
games. Thus a natural interpretation is of essentially anonymous interactions, in 
which the individuals  -one deals with today are not recognizably  the same as 
those dealt with yesterday.  Another distinction  is that my analysis  of evolution- 
ary  games  focuses on the distribution  of behaviors  in populations  rather  than on 
the behavior  of rational  individuals.3 
From the standpoint  of an economist specializing  in game theory, the static 
features  of my formal  model are minor  variants  of standard  normal  form  games, 
2 These dynamics  are also referred  to as replicator  dynamics  or as (the radial  projection  onto the 
simplex  of) the Lotka-Volterra  equations. 
3That  is, I interpret  the evolving  state as a distribution  of strategies  across a population.  One 
could also interpret  it as the evolving  (virtual  or actual)  mixed  strategy  employed  by an individual, 
but one must then deal with some deep issues regarding  rationality.  In Section 4 I will cite some 
recent  papers  that employ  this individualistic  interpretation. EVOLUTIONARY  GAMES  IN  ECONOMICS  639 
but the dynamic features and evolutionary perspective will perhaps seem novel. 
Even  for  an  economist  interested  only  in  long  run  equilibrium outcomes,  a 
dynamic approach offers  important benefits.  First, one  can  distinguish stable 
from unstable equilibria. More generally, one  can find the basins of attraction, 
i.e., the regions of initial conditions that eventually lead to a given equilibrium. 
Thus in principle one can identify which equilibrium point (if any4) is relevant. 
The next section briefly presents the formal ingredients of the model: spaces 
of states and strategies, fitness functions (variants of payoff functions) to specify 
strategic interaction,  and systems of  ordinary differential equations  to  specify 
dynamics. I then provide five simple examples. The first two are intended to give 
the reader an intuitive grasp of evolutionary games' structure and behavior and 
to motivate the pivotal concept of compatibility. The remaining examples make 
connections to previous literature from biology and elsewhere. Next I show how 
compatible dynamics can be summarized as cone fields, and end the section by 
defining static and dynamic equilibrium concepts. 
The  analytic results are collected  in Section  3. The most important demon- 
strate a close general relationship between the dynamic equilibria and the Nash 
equilibria  (NE)  of  a  fitness  function-viz:  all  NE  are  compatible  dynamic 
equilibria (Proposition 3.2) and all compatible dynamic stable equilibria are NE 
(Proposition 3.3). Of secondary interest is the relationship between ESS and the 
dynamic equilibria. The ESS are always a subset of the NE, so to the extent that 
Maynard Smith correctly identifies the dynamically stable equilibria in terms of 
his ESS  criteria, he  provides game  theorists with  an  appealing  refinement  of 
NE. Unfortunately in general ESS is neither necessary nor sufficient for compat- 
ible  dynamic stability,  although  there  are  some  interesting  special  cases  for 
which it is (Proposition 3.4 and counterexamples). Section 4 briefly summarizes 
the argument, points to some possible generalizations of the model, and surveys 
some  recent  and  prospective  applications  of  evolutionary  games.  Notational 
conventions, technical definitions, and proofs are collected  in an Appendix. 
2.  THE  MODEL 
2.1.  Basic Elements 
Consider a set of interacting populations, indexed  k =  1,...,  K. A member of 
each population  k  has available a finite number of  actions (sometimes  called 
"behaviors" or "strategies") indexed  i = 1...,  N.  (The increased generality in 
allowing N  to depend on k is negligible and not worth the increased notational 
burden.)  Any point rk in the N-simplex  ,k  {X =  (X1,...,  XN):  Xi > 0,  EXi  =  1} 
represents a possible  mixed strategy for an individual member of population  k. 
Any point  Sk  in the same simplex also represents the fractions of population k 
employing each available strategy. Hence  the Cartesian product of  K copies of 
4In  general  dynamical  systems,  the  state  ultimately  may  approach  a  limit  cycle  or  chaotic 
attractor rather than an equilibrium point. The analysis in the present paper, however, focuses on 
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the simplex, S = s1 x ...  x SK, is the set of strategy  profiles and also is the 
state space  under  the  maintained  interpretation  that  interactions  are  anony- 
mous. It will be used for both purposes below.5 
Strategic interaction  is summarized in a fitness function which specifies  for 
individuals in each population the evolutionarily relevant payoff as a function of 
own strategy and current state. Formally a fitness function consists of maps f  k: 
Sk  x  S -*  R,  k = 1, ...,  K, which are assumed linear in the  first (own strategy) 
argument  rk  e  Sk  and  continuously  differentiable  in  the  second  (population 
state) argument s E  s.6  The fitness function can be written more compactly as 
f:  S x S -*  RK, with f(r  s)  (f'l(rl  s)  fK(rK,  s)).  The  linearity in  x =  r 
can be  regarded as a  "large numbers" assumption: for  large populations  the 
fitness  of  a  mixed  strategy  is  the  expected  fitness  of  its  component  pure 
strategies. This linearity permits an alternative representation  in terms of  the 
fitness gradient vector  fk(s)  E RN  for population  k individuals given state s e  S, 
with  x .fk(s)  =f  k(x,  s) for all x ES 
The final basic model element  is a dynamical structure specifying how a state 
s  evolves over time. In continuous time7 one  specifies the time derivatives s = 
(s  .  ...,  sK),  with  sk=  (k,...  .,  Sk):=  (dsk/dt,..  .,  dsk/dt),  by  means  of  some 
function  F:  S -*> RNK.  Thus 
(2.1)  s = F(s) 
is an autonomous system of ordinary differential equations whose solution curve 
s(t)  from given initial conditions  s(0) E S describes the evolution of all popula- 
tions  beginning  at  any  state  of  interest.  Some  restrictions  are  required  for 
legitimate dynamics. Say that F:  S  -*  RNK  is admissible if: 
N 
(a)  E  Fk(s)  = 0 for all s E S and k=  l,...,N; 
i=l 
(b)  Si/ =  0 implies Fk(s)  =  0, and 
(c)  F is continuous and piecewise differentiable on S. 
The first two conditions ensure that  Sk  doesn't leave the simplex Sk: by (a) the 
5The  dual role of S and its relation to the anonymous population interpretation will be discussed 
further in the last section. 
6Crawford  (1989) shows that assuming continuity of the fitness function (in its second argument) 
has real bite. It may be worth mentioning that although the fitness function is closely related to the 
traditional  payoff  function  of  normal  form  games,  there  are  formal  and  (in  some  contexts) 
conceptual  differences.  In  the  special  case  that  fk  depends  perhaps  on  the  state  of  other 
populations  s-k  but does  not  depend on own population  5k,  the standard payoff function  g  with 
components  gk(5  fkX)  := f  k(X,  S)  is equivalent to the fitness function f. Own population effects and 
some conceptual distinctions will be illustrated in Examples 3 and 5 of the next subsection. 
7 I will not analyze discrete time dynamics (difference equations) in this paper. Apart from some 
minor but annoying technicalities concerning behavior at the boundary of the simplex, it appears to 
be a routine exercise to obtain discrete time analogs for most of my results. Indeed Nachbar (1989) 
and  Samuelson  (1987),  working independently  and  using  different  techniques,  obtain  difference 
equation  analogues  of  (the  order-compatible  version  of)  my  Propositions  3.2  and  3.3  for  fairly 
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TABLE I 
PAYOFF BIMATRIX  FOR BASIC BUYER / SELLER  GAME 
Seller:  1 ("honest")  2 ("cheat") 
Buyer:  1 ("inspect")  (3,2)  (2,1) 
2 ("don't")  (4,3)  (1,4) 
population  fractions  will continue to sum to unity, and (b) prevents fractions 
from becoming negative. Also (b) prevents the revival of extinct strategies.8 
Condition (c) is  a  mild technical condition to  help ensure "well-behaved" 
solutions; actually, the weaker assumption  of  Lipshitz continuity guarantees 
unique solution curves and would suffice for most purposes.  An admissible  F 
henceforth  will be referred to as a dynamical  system  (or, simply, a dynamic) 
on S. 
2.2.  Some Simple Examples 
EXAMPLE  1: Basic ideas. Consider  a stylized  interaction  between two popula- 
tions,  called  "buyers" (k =  1) and "sellers" (k = 2). Each  seller  has  available 
two possible actions or strategies, "honest" (i = 1) and "cheat" (i = 2); and each 
buyer also has two alternative  strategies,  "inspect"  (i = 1) and "don't inspect" 
(i =  2). Since the  strategy/state simplices here are 1-dimensional  the  state 
S =  ((s,  S2),  (S2,  S2))  can be described  by a point  (p, q) in the square  [0, 1] x [0, 1], 
with sl =p  as the fraction  of buyers  who inspect and S2 = q as the fraction  of 
honest sellers, so s5 =  1 -p  and s2  =  1 -  q. 
The populations  interact  in an unorganized  market  in which  individual  buyers 
and sellers  of, say, used cars  meet and participation  is occasional  so reputational 
effects, etc., are negligible.  The fitness of a strategy  depends on the population 
mix of chosen strategies,  e.g., cheating is less attractive  to sellers when more 
buyers inspect, but otherwise matters are as simple as possible (e.g., random 
matching,  no externalities,  and risk neutrality).  Specifically,  assume that the 
fitness function is bilinear and given by the bimatrix  of Table I.9 Thus for a 
buyer the  fitness of  e1 =  (1,0)  =  inspect with probability 1, is  f'(e1;  s) =  3q + 
2(1 -  q) = q + 2 (independent  of p)  and f 1(e2;  s) = 4q + (1 -  q) = 3q + 1 is the 
fitness of not inspecting.  Likewise  f2(el;  s) = 3 - p is the fitness for a seller of 
being honest with probability  1 and f2(e2;  s) = 4 -  3p is the fitness  of cheating. 
8 Presumably  imitation  and perhaps  simple  versions  of Bayesian  learning  would not permit  the 
revival  of extinct strategies,  but more flexible ideas of learning  might well permit it. The direct 
restriction  (b) has no  bite in stability analysis, since all strategies, extinct or otherwise, are 
contemplated  in a general  small  perturbation.  See also Remark  3.2 below. 
9 The table  entries  are from  Game  72 of Rapoport  and Guyer  (1966).  Pitchik  and Schotter  (1987) 
analyze  essentially  the same strategic  situation  in greater  depth. However,  their comparative  static 
results  implicitly  assume  that the interior  NE is stable, and the analysis  to follow shows that this 
assumption  is problematic.  See also Frank  (1987)  for a single-population  game  with a similar  flavor. 642  DANIEL  FRIEDMAN 
q=1 
.q=1/2Q 
0  * 
0  p=1/2  p=1 
FIGURE 1 
As  for dynamics, assume with Malthus that the  growth rate of  a strategy is 
proportional to or (with an appropriate choice of time scale) equal to its relative 
fitness. That is, the  growth rate of  inspection  (ln 'p) = p/p  is equal  to  its fit- 
ness  f'(e';s)  less  the  population  average  fitness  among  buyers  f'(p;s)= 
pf '(e;  s) + (1 -p)f  '(e2;  s). Hence, 
(2.2)  p =p(1  -p)(1  -  2q). 
The growth rate q/q  of honesty among sellers is its relative fitness f2(e';  s) - 
f2(q;  s) = (1 -  q)(2p  -  1), so 
(2.3)  q = q(1  -  q)(2p  -  1). 
It is easy to check that the system (2.2)-(2.3)  of coupled differential equations 
has five fixed points (i.e., steady-states), at the center and at the four corners of 
the p -  q square. It can be shown (see  the Appendix) that all other points are 
on periodic  trajectories circling counterclockwise,  as shown in Figure  1. Thus 
under Malthusian dynamics the  four corner fixed points  are unstable  and the 
center point is neutral, neither asymptotically stable nor unstable. 
EXAMPLE  2:  Alternative  dynamics.  Economically  plausible  alternatives  to 
Malthusian dynamics can be constructed from specific models of imitation and 
learning. For example,  suppose  that each  used  car buyer transacts only once; 
before making his or her own choice, the buyer observes the choice of a single, 
randomly selected  previous buyer and, with a small exogeneous  probability a, 
also  observes  the  predecessor's  payoff.  Assuming  that  all  participants  are 
Bayesians with diffuse priors over p  and q and with common knowledge of the 
information structure, it evidently is rational for the  new buyer to imitate the 
predecessor's  choice when  the outcome  is not observed, and to make a "best 
reply" to the inferred seller choice when the outcome is observed. This behavior 
yields the discrete-time dynamic Jp  = a(-  q + [1 -  q]). Choosing the time scale 
so that  At = 2a  and taking the limit as the information lag  At -O 0 one obtains 
the  differential  equation  P =  -  q.  By  strict  analogy  the  sellers'  population 
obeys the differential equation q =p  2v EVOLUTIONARY  GAMES  IN  ECONOMICS  643 
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q=1/2 
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FIGURE 2 
One can also directly postulate linear dynamics by setting the rate of change 
(not the growth rate as in Malthus) of a strategy equal to its fitness relative to 
the simple average (not population-weighted  average) of all strategies currently 
employed.10 From the Table I fitness function one calculates 
p5  =  f '(el; s) -  2 [ f  (el; s)  +f l(e  2;  S)] 
= 2f 't(el;  5)  -  f  l(e  2;  5)],  i.e., 
(2.4)  p=  -  q 
and similarly, 
(2.5)  q=p  -  2 
for (p, q) in the interior of the square. To keep p  and q in [0, 1], override (2.4) 
and (2.5) by 
(2.6)  pb=Oifp=0,1;  q=Oif  q=0,1. 
Clearly the  piecewise  linear  system  (2.4)-(2.6)  has  exactly the  same  fixed 
points  as the  system (2.2)-(2.3),  and trajectories near (1,  2)  are counter-clock- 
wise  concentric  circles.  The  main  qualitative difference  from the  Malthusian 
version is that strategies can become  extinct in finite time. 
One can imagine many other sorts of dynamics, but it is reasonable to require 
compatibility with the  fitness function  in the  sense  that  fitter strategies should 
increase relative to less fit strategies. In the present example inspection is fitter or 
less fit for buyers,  i.e., f'(e1;  s)  tf  (e2;  s),  as q >  2;  and similarly f2(el;  s) 
f2(e2;  s) as p  1 
2.  Thus the requirement is that all dynamical systems compati- 
ble with the fitness function of Table I will specify tangent vectors (pb,  q) such 
that pb  ;  0 as q >  2  and q Q 0 as p ;  2.  The set of all such tangent vectors form 
the cones  sketched at a few points in Figure 2. Compatible dynamics evidently 
all have the  same five fixed points,  the  four corner points  being  saddles.  The 
center point could be stable or unstable depending on which specific compatible 
dynamic is chosen.  Using  the  static  equilibrium concepts  defined  in  the  next 
10  These  linear dynamics were developed jointly with Jack Hirshleifer. 644  DANIEL  FRIEDMAN 
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subsection it is easy to show that the center point is the unique NE and that no 
ESS exists for the present fitness function. 
The  remaining examples mainly illustrate relationships to previous literature 
and can be skipped with little loss of continuity. 
EXAMPLE  3:  Other  two-strategy games.  Any  2 x 2  bimatrix  game  can  be 
analyzed in exactly the same way as above. For instance, a version of the Battle 
of the Sexes"1 has the payoff bimatrix 
{2,2  3,48 
\4,3  1,1J 
The phase portrait under Malthusian dynamics is symmetric with a saddle point 
at the  center,  "sources" at (0, 0)  and (1, 1) and "sinks" at (1, 0)  and (0, 1), as 
shown in Figure 3. The linear dynamics produce a very similar phase portrait. 
Indeed, it is not difficult to check that the compatibility condition defines cones 
in  the  four  quadrants of  the  state  space  such  that  any  compatible  dynamic 
produces a phase portrait qualitatively similar to Figure 3. In terms of the story 
usually told  about this game,  the  present  analysis therefore  suggests that the 
populations  evolve so that the sex which initially was more insistent on getting 
its own way will ultimately always get its way and the other sex ultimately will 
always accommodate.  Of  course,  to  be  consistent  with  my  interpretation  of 
evolutionary games as anonymous interactions of populations, the story should 
be  about  socially  acceptable  behavior  on  first dates  and  not  about  ongoing 
behavior in marriage. 
Fitness functions obtained  in this way from bimatrices have no own-popula- 
tion effects, but can readily be modified to incorporate them. For example, in 
the buyers and sellers story, widespread inspection (high values of p)  might tie 
up sellers and hence impose external costs on buyers. Similarly sellers could also 
suffer from negative own-population effects. Thus one could justify appending a 
term  - ap  to  the  f1  and  a term  - bq  to  the  f2  from Example  1, for small 
positive constants  a and  b. It can be shown that in this case the central fixed 
point becomes stable, but other fixed points (and static equilibria) do not change 
status. 
11  Biologists use the same name to refer to a quite different game. EVOLUTIONARY  GAMES  IN  ECONOMICS  645 
There is no need  to limit the number of interacting populations to two. For 
example, one  could augment the basic buyer/seller  game by adding a popula- 
tion of regulators, who can either be active (achieving the same detection rate of 
dishonesty, say, as buyers who inspect) or inactive. With plausible assignments 
of payoffs for regulators one  obtains phase portraits on the unit cube in which 
inspection  eventually  disappears  among  buyers,  and  cheating  by  sellers  and 
activity by regulators cycles around a neutrally stable point; this point becomes 
stable in the presence of appropriate external costs. 
EXAMPLE  4:  A  K =  1,  N = 3  game from  biology. A  single  population  can 
interact  with  itself,  so  that  only  own-population  effects  are  present.  The 
interaction can be specified as a bimatrix game with an arbitrary  number of pure 
strategies,  as long  as the  payoff matrix for the  "row" player A = (aij)  is  the 
transpose of the payoff matrix for the  "column" player. The transpose restric- 
tion ensures that row and column players are strategically identical, and so can 
be  regarded  as  in  the  same  population.  For  example,  consider  the  standard 
interpretation for bimatrix games in biology, that a given individual (the  "row 
player") playing pure strategy i, is paired with another individual (the "column 
player") drawn randomly from the same population. The row player receives a 
when the column player plays j.  If the column player is strategically the same, 
her payoff must be  a1p. 
For example, Maynard Smith (1982, p. 22) specifies  a territorial contest  for 
some  animal species  in which three  behaviors (strategies)  are available: i = 1 
or  H  ("Hawk"),  i = 2  or  D  ("Dove"),  and  i = 3  or  B  ("Bourgeois").  The 
state/strategy  space  S  is  the  2-dimensional  unit  simplex in  R3  with vertices 
e=  (L,O,0), e2 =  (0, 1,0),  and  e3=  (0,0, 1). After  rescaling, the  payoff matrix 
(for the row player) in this game is: 
-2  4  1 
A=  0  2  1). 
-1  3  2 
Thus, an  H  player gets a payoff of  -2  against another H,  but  + 4 against D 
and  + 1 against B. The  fitness function here  is  f(x,  s) =  =lxisjai  =x  -As, 
the expected payoff to mixed strategy x when matched with an opponent drawn 
randomly from  a  population  at  state  s.  It  can  be  shown  directly  from  the 
definitions that the two NE are s^:=  (,1  2, 0) and e3, and that e3 is the only ESS 
for this fitness function. 
As usual, Malthusian dynamics are defined by equating for each strategy i the 
growth rate  Jil  to the relative fitness f(ei,  s) -  f(s,  s). Hence  one obtains the 
polynomial (cubic) equations 
(2.7)  9i=sj(e'  As-s  As),  i=  1,2,3. 
As  shown  in  Figure  4,  the  fixed points  are  el  and  e2  (unstable,  sources),  s^ 
(unstable, a saddle), and e3 (stable, a sink). The latter is a global attractor: from 646  DANIEL  FRIEDMAN 
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almost any initial state there is a transient tendency for the  proportions of  H 
and D  to equalize, but ultimately the state evolves to 100% B. 
EXAMPLE  5:  A  migration process.2  Consider  again  two  populations  (row 
players and column players) each with two pure strategies, and let the matrix 
A =  0  4) 
describe  the  dollar  outcomes  of  the  interaction.  For  x  denoting  the  point 
(x, 1 -  x)  in the 2-simplex, one sees that h(x, q)  =x  Aq  is the expected payoff 
for a row player (resp. h(x, p)  for a column player) employing the first strategy 
with probability x E [0, 1] when  q (resp. p)  is the fraction of column (resp. row) 
players employing their first strategy in random pairings. One can verify that the 
NE for h (or A)  are (0, 1), (1, 0) and (0.25, 0.25). 
Now,  following  James  Friedman  and  Robert  Rosenthal  (1986),  assume  a 
migration dynamic for each population with the emigration rate from a strategy 
proportional  to  the  difference  between  the  overall  maximum payoff and  the 
expected payoff for the given strategy. Specifically, the maximum payoff is 12, so 
the  row player emigration  rates  are  mi(q):=  (12 -  ail)q + (12 -  ai2)(1  -  q) = 
12 -  h(2 -  i, q) for strategy i = 1, 2, and mi(p)  gives the column player emigra- 
tion  rates.  Consequently  the  population  of  row  players  is  described  by  the 
differential equation 
(2.8)  p = -pml(q)  + (1 -p)m2(q), 
the  two  terms  representing  emigration  from  and  immigration  to  the  first 
strategy.  The  column  population  obeys  the  same  equation  with  p  and  q 
interchanged. One can verify that the NE (0.25,0.25)  is not a fixed point of this 
dynamic on  the  square; indeed,  the  only symmetric fixed point  is  at approxi- 
mately (0.42,0.42),  and it is stable. 
Here  the  payoff function  h  is not  a fitness  function  because  the  migration 
dynamic itself  also  affects survivability of  a strategy. Specifically, one  has  the 
"decreasing returns" effect  that as prevalence of  a strategy increases,  emigra- 
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tion  from  it  increases  and  immigration  to  it  decreases,  other  things  equal. 
The  dynamics (2.8)  are  compatible  with  the  fitness  function  f 1(x, p, q) = xL 
pj(h(x, q) -  12). 
2.3.  Compatibility 
A  given fitness  function  can  give  rise  to  many sorts of  dynamics. Perhaps 
individuals change strategies when  realized fitness falls below  some  threshold, 
as  in  Nelson  and  Winter (1982)  or  as  in  numerous  adjustment cost  models. 
Perhaps individuals are able to observe a sample of contemporaneous  interac- 
tions  and (subject to  sampling error) imitate the  apparently fitter strategies.13 
Perhaps rational (Bayesian) individuals gradually learn the full structure of the 
fitness function and the distributions of strategy choices in the populations (see 
Shefrin (1981) for a model with this flavor). Or perhaps, as in Crawford (1989), 
players employ adaptive strategies because  of strategic uncertainty. As long as 
some sort of adjustment cost or informational imperfection or imperfect ratio- 
nality precludes  simultaneous jumps in behavior by a positive  fraction of  the 
population,  it makes sense  to  describe the  (co)evolution  of population(s)  with 
dynamics defined  by a system of  differential equations.  Unfortunately  in eco- 
nomic applications the precise specification of evolutionary dynamics seems very 
context-specific. 
However, evolutionary dynamics are not completely arbitrary. The evolution- 
arily relevant aspect of a strategic interaction is not some subjective utility but 
rather the objective survivability  or fitness it awards to a strategy. It is therefore 
axiomatic  that  for  any  dynamic compatible  with  a  properly  specified  fitness 
function fitter strategies should increase relative to less fit strategies. 
To  formalize  compatibility  it  is  convenient  to  denote  the  set  of  extinct 
strategies  in population  k  by the  index set  I'(sk)  =  {i:  Sik =  0)  and the  other 
(nonextinct,  S/k  > 0) strategies by I(Sk).  Say the  dynamic F:  S -*  RNK iS order 
compatible with a fitness function f  if, for each  k =  1,...  , K, we have Fik(s) > 
Fk(S)  if  fk(ei,  s)  >fk(ei,  s)  for all i, j E I(Sk),  and Fik(S) = 0 for i E  I,(Sk ). The 
last qualification applies the  ordinal relationship only to nonextinct  strategies, 
and repeats the admissibility condition (b) that F can't revive extinct strategies. 
An  alternative,  less  stringent  requirement  is  that  there  is  just  a  positive 
correlation  between the components  of the velocity  vector  gk =  (5k,...,  5k ) and 
those of the fitness gradient f  k(S)  =  (f  k(el,  s),  ..  .,  f  k(eN,  s)).  Formally, say the 
dynamic F:  S --  RNK  is  weak compatible with  a fitness function  f  if, for  all 
k = 1, ...,  K,  and s E S, we have F k(S)=ON  iff  fk(ei, s) =a  for some  a E R1 
and all i E  I(Sk),  and otherwise Fk(s)  fk(s)  > 0. The first part of the definition 
allows the  tangent vector  to  be  zero  only where  all nonextinct  strategies  are 
equally fit; elsewhere  the tangent vector FI(s)  and the fitness vector fkC make 
an angle of less than 900. 
13 My thanks to John Riley for suggesting this interpretation. 648  DANIEL  FRIEDMAN 
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Both concepts  of compatibility are illustrated in Figure 5. A point  x = sk  in 
the interior of the unit 3-simplex  Sk  is chosen for reference,  and the isoquant 
(a)  through  5k  as well  as two  nearby isoquants (a + e)  are  shown for  some 
fitness function  fk.  Order compatible dynamics will have solution  curves with 
tangent vectors at  5k  which lie inside the cone sketched on the left of Figure 5. 
Here  fk(ei,  s)  >fk(el  ,s)  >fk(ei,  s)  so the  cone  is open,  bounded  by the  rays 
[e1 = el > e']  and [e1 > e1 = ei], and contains the projection X7T of fk(s)  onto the 
tangent plane. Similarly, the diagram to the right of the simplex shows the open 
half-space  of  weak  compatible  admissible tangent vectors  for  fk  at  5k.  Thus 
weak-compatible  dynamics will  have  trajectories which  move  towards higher 
isoquants.'4 
In some contexts one might prefer to impose compatibility conditions on the 
growth rates (ln 'sk)  =  S//sk  rather than directly on the rates of change  5k  of 
population  fractions.  Thus,  let  G:  S -*  RNK  be  differentiable  and  let  D(s) 
represent  the  NKXNK  diagonal  matrix with  the  components  of  the  vector 
s E RNK down the diagonal. Suppose  Gk(s)  is perpendicular to  5k  for each  k, 
and  G  is  compatible  (order  or  weak)  with  a  fitness  function  f.  Then  F: 
S -*  RNK,  defined by F(s):=  D(s)G(s),  will be a (n  admissible) dynamic whose 
growth rates by construction are compatible with f.  I will refer to differentiable 
functions  G:  S -*  RNK  with  Gk  perpendicular to  Sk  as  predynamics for  this 
reason. 
A  compact summary of  all compatible  dynamics greatly simplifies proofs of 
the main results. As illustrated in Figure 5, the admissible tangent vectors that 
are order (or weak) compatible  with  a given fitness function  at  a given state 
form a cone  in the tangent space of  S  at that state. This observation suggests 
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that the technical device of cone  fields, introduced in the context of exchange 
dynamics by Smale (1976), will be equally useful in the present context of game 
dynamics. In each version of compatibility (order or weak, dynamics or predy- 
namics) one  specifies for each population  k  and each state  s  in S  a subset of 
tangent vectors (a cone  Z)  that are admissible and compatible in the appropri- 
ate sense. The Appendix contains formal definitions. 
Two specific compatible dynamics obtained directly from the fitness function 
are  worth  mentioning.  The  first merely  sets  Fk(s)  equal  to  the  orthogonal 
projection of  fk(s)  onto  the  tangent space of  the (sub)simplex. Hence  if  f  is 
bilinear this dynamic is piecewise  linear, and linear on  each open  subsimplex. 
Intuitively, its trajectories head straight up the "fitness hill" on each  Sk  (or on 
the appropriate subsimplex, if some strategies are extinct in population  k). We 
encountered this dynamic in Example 2, equations (2.4)-(2.6).  I will denote it by 
Lf  and call it the linear dynamic. 
The  other  dynamic, denoted  Mf,  is analogous for growth rates. Intuitively, 
one  renormalizes the  fitness vector so  it is a predynamic and then  the  corre- 
sponding dynamic will feature  strategy growth rates equal to  relative strategy 
fitness-that  is, we obtain the Malthusian dynamic. Since Mf works with growth 
rates, strategies never become extinct in finite time in the trajectories it defines, 
while they certainly can under the  Lf  dynamic. The precise construction of  Lf 
and Mf  for an arbitrary fitness function f  can be found in the Appendix. 
2.4.  Equilibrium  Concepts 
Two  static concepts  of  equilibrium can be  defined  directly from the  fitness 
function.  Say that  s  is  a  Noncooperative (or Nash)  equilibrium  point  for  the 
fitness function f,  and write s E NE(f ), if  f  k(X,  s) <f  k(Sk,  s)  for all x E Sk, 
k = 1,...,  K. The intuition is the same as in standard game theory: the inequal- 
ity says that  5k  is  a  (weak) best  reply against  s  for  all  k.  Say that  s  is  an 
evolutionary stable state for the fitness function f,  and write s E ESS(f  ), if for 
each k=1,...,K  and x  5skCE  sk,  we have either (a) f  k(X,s)<  f  k(Sk,s)  or 
(b)  f  k(X,  s) =fk(sk,  s)  and  fk(X,  SJkXe)  <f  k(sk,  SJkX8)  for  e > 0  sufficiently 
small. The notation  SlkX  means (s1,...,  5k-1  , X, sk+1,  ...  .  SK),  and  SlkX,  means 
(1 -  e)s  +  e(slkX),  i.e., a slight perturbation of  5k  towards x.  Of course, in the 
case that f  is bilinear, the references to  e can be dropped from the definition. 
REMARK  2.1:  Obviously ESS is a refinement of NE, i.e.,  ESS(f  ) c NE(f  ). 
REMARK  2.2:  An equivalent definition for ESS is simply that  f  k(x,  slkxE)  < 
f k(Sk, slkX,)  for  e > 0  sufficiently  small.  However,  a  two-part  definition  is 
traditional, and helps distinguish two useful cases. 
REMARK  2.3: Maynard Smith's intuition, explained at length in his 1982 book, 
is that ESS is a stability condition. Think of  x  as a mutant strategy, so  slkXE  is 
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defining ESS say that mutants are less fit than the dominant group (and hence 
presumably will disappear) either  because  (a) they do less  well  in encounters 
with  the  dominant  group or (b)  they  do  equally well  in  encounters  with  the 
dominant group but less well in encounters with other mutants. I will refer to an 
assertion that ESS is necessary or sufficient for dynamic stability as a Maynard 
Smith conjecture. 
REMARK  2.4: Nash  equilibrium points  exist  for  every fitness  function.  The 
proof is a minor variant on the standard existence proof for NE in normal form 
games, using the Kakutani fixed point theorem. 
REMARK  2.5: NE states can be characterized as those whose "extinct" strate- 
gies (i.e.,  i such that  Sk  =  0) are no more fit than nonextinct strategies (Sk  >  0) 
and whose nonextinct strategies are equally fit. Formally, we have the following: 
Let  axk := max{f  k(ei, s):  i =  1,..  .,  N).  Then s is a Nash equilibrium  point  iff, 
for each k, f k(ei, s) = ak for all i such that sk > 0. 
The proof again is standard, with details available from the author. 
REMARK  2.6: It is tempting in light of the previous remark to conjecture that 
ESS are the  subset of NE  for which extinct strategies are strictly less  fit than 
nonextinct strategies for each population, and for which the nonextinct strate- 
gies  reach peak  fitness  in some  sense  (say a negative-definiteness  condition). 
Taylor and Jonker (1978) show that this conjecture is almost but not quite true. 
Following their approach, define s* E S  to be a regular ESS  if (a) f k(ei,  s*) < 
a  :=fk(s*k,  s*)  for  all  i  such  that  Sk =  O,  and  (b)  the  matrix  Ak  = 
((fk(ei,  s*)/Idsk))  is  negative  definite  on  the  tangent  space  at  sk  {z  e RN: 
Ezi = 0,  and S*k  =  0=  zj = 0), for each k =  1,...,  K. Taylor and Jonker argue 
that every regular ESS is an ESS, and almost every ESS is regular.15 
The dynamic equilibrium concepts  are conceptually straightforward:  we seek 
to characterize steady states,  and states to which the  dynamic process  returns 
following  a  small  perturbation.  Such  equilibria  are  defined  in  terms  of  the 
function F  that specifies the dynamical system on  S. Say that s  is a fixed point 
(a.k.a. steady state or equilibrium point) for the dynamic F, and write s E FP(F), 
if all components of F(s)  are 0. Such states are steady in that s(t)  = s(O) for all 
t E  [0, co) iff  s(O) E FP(F).  Say that s is an evolutionary equilibrium  (a.k.a. stable 
equilibrium or  persistent  state)  for  F,  and write  s eEE(F),  if  s  is  a  locally 
asymptotically stable fixed point, i.e., if s  is a fixed point and it has some open 
neighborhood  N c S  such that  s(t)  ->s  as  t -*  oo wherever  s(O) E N. Thus  all 
states near an evolutionary equilibrium will eventually evolve towards it. 
15 The  matrix could  be  only  negative  semi-definite,  yet  the  inequality in  part (b)  of  the  ESS 
definition  might still  hold  because  of  higher-order terms. The  regularity condition  rules out  this 
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3.  RESULTS 
Given  the four equilibrium  concepts  just defined,  the theorist  will instinctively 
ask about their relationships.  The applied researcher  investigating  a specific 
fitness function f  and compatible  dynamic  F also has a stake in the question. 
Evolutionary  equilibria  of F, as the persistent  states of the model, provide  the 
basic predictions for  observables, but  these  equilibria may be  difficult to 
compute  directly  and need not exist. The more convenient  static equilibria  of f 
take on added interest  once the investigator  has theoretical  reassurance  of their 
relationships  to evolutionary  equilibria. 
For standard  biological  models the relationships  among  the equilibria  are by 
now well known:  for the Malthusian  dynamic  Mf of a bilinear  single-population 
fitness function f  we have 
ESS(f)  CEE(Mf)  cNE(f)  CFP(Mf); 
see van Damme (1987) for instance. In particular,  the static ESS concept is 
sufficient  and NE is necessary  for evolutionary  equilibrium  in standard  biologi- 
cal models. 
This section will show that the last two inclusions  are quite general:  for any 
dynamic  F even weakly  compatible  with a given (possibly  nonlinear  and multi- 
population)  fitness function f,  the evolutionary  equilibria  of F must all be NE 
of f  (Proposition  3.2) and all NE of f  must be fixed points of the dynamic  F. 
These results allow the researcher  to confidently  apply  known  existence results 
for NE and simple computational  devices for FP. On the other hand, the first 
inclusion  does not generalize  as well (Proposition  3.4 and counterexamples),  so 
the researcher  can avoid  possibly  misleading  analyses  of ESS. 
We begin with the preliminary  result that, as Figure 5 and the choice of 
terminology  suggest,  order compatibility  implies  weak compatibility.  The result 
streamlines  the statement  and proof of the main propositions. 
PROPOSITION  3.1:  For every fitness function f,  for  every state s in S,  and for 
k =  1,...,  K, the order  compatible  cones  Zk  (f, s) for dynamics  and  Zk  (f,s ) for 
predynamics are subsets of the corresponding  weak compatible cones Zkc(f,  s) and 
Zk (f,s). 
See the Appendix  for a proof of this and the other propositions. 
The next result confirms  that a static equilibrium  concept  (NE) is a sufficient 
condition  for dynamic  equilibrium  (FP) for any compatible  dynamic.  Existence 
of dynamic  equilibrium  is a corollary.  The proposition  also shows  that the static 
and dynamic  concepts actually  coincide for interior equilibria,  i.e., equilibria 
with no extinct  strategies. 
PROPOSITION  3.2:  Let  the  dynamic F  be  weak  compatible with  the fitness 
function f.  Alternatively, let the predynamic G be weak compatible with f  and let 
F(s)  = D(s)G(s).  In either case,  all Nash  equilibria are fixed points and all in- 652  DANIEL  FRIEDMAN 
terior fixed points are Nash  equilibria, i.e.,  NE(f  ) cFP(F)  and NE(f  ) n S? = 
FP(F)  n SO. 
COROLLARY  3.2.1:  Proposition 3.2  also holds with "order compatible" replac- 
ing "weak compatible." 
PROOF:  Follows directly from Proposition 3.1. 
COROLLARY  3.2.2:  Let the dynamic F be weak or order compatible with some 
fitness  function  f.  Alternatively,  let  F(s)  = D(s)G(s)  with  G  weak  or  order 
compatible with f.  Then F has an equilibrium  point,  i.e.,  FP(F)  *  0. 
PROOF:  Follows from Remark 2.4, Proposition 3.2, and Corollary 3.2.1. 
As  a complement  to  the  previous proposition,  the  next result confirms that 
the  evolutionary  equilibria  (EE)  are  always NE  for  a  corresponding  fitness 
function. 
PROPOSITION  3.3:  Let  the  dynamic F  be  weak  compatible with  the fitness 
function f,  or alternatively let F(s)  = D(s)G(s)  and let G be a predynamic which 
is weak compatible with f.  Then all stable equilibria of F are Nash equilibria, i.e., 
EE(F)  cNE(f). 
COROLLARY  3.3.1:  Proposition 3.3 also holds with "order compatible" replac- 
ing "weak compatible." 
PROOF:  Follows directly again from Proposition 3.1. 
REMARK  3.1: By  analogy with  the  last  part of  Proposition  3.2,  one  migir 
wonder  if  EE(F)  sometimes  coincides  with  NE(f).  In  particular, for  SE= 
{el, ... .,  eN}K representing the extreme points of  S (i.e., each population adopts 
a single strategy with probability 1) it is reasonable to conjecture that NE(f  ) n 
SE  = EE(F)  n SE  for F  compatible with f,  so strict NE  implies ESS. It is not 
difficult to  see  that  the  conjecture  is  true  if  the  values  fk(ei,  s)  are  distinct 
(across i) for s E  SE, which usually (i.e., for generic f ) is the case. 
REMARK  3.2:  One could weaken the definition of admissibility, so that extinct 
strategies  i e I'(s)  could  be  revived  (without  perturbing  the  state)  and  only 
further decreases  for  such  strategies  (i.e.,  choice  by a  negative fraction  of  a 
population) are excluded. Weakening admissibility means reducing the number 
of  fixed  points,  since  F(s)  0 0  is  possible  more  often.  Indeed,  under  the 
weakened  definition NE(f  ) = FP(F)  and examples of unstable fixed points are 
harder to  come  by. No  similar modification seems  appropriate for the  growth 
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REMARK  3.3: It can be shown that Propositions  3.2  and 3.3,  together  with 
Remark  2.5 and the definitions,  offer convenient  computational  algorithms  for 
equilibria  of evolutionary  games, particularly  when the fitness function  is bilin- 
ear. In this case, the definition of FP provides for each subsimplex  a square 
system  of linear equations  stating  that the fitnesses of nonextinct  strategies  are 
equal, and that points lie in the relevant  subsimplex.  Solutions  to the system  can 
be  tested for the additional NE,  ESS, and EE properties. For details, see 
Friedman  (1987) and the biological  literature,  especially  Haigh (1975). 
The  last proposition collects positive results concerning Maynard Smith 
conjectures.  If one is interested  only in linear  or Malthusian  dynamics,  or if one 
has a symmetric  fitness function, then the conjectures  are mostly correct.  The 
conjectures  evidently  arose from consideration  of a bilinear  fitness function  for 
one population  and two strategies  (illustrated  in Figure  6 below and discussed  in 
the last proof in the Appendix),  so it is no surprise  that they also hold in this 
case. 
PROPOSITION  3.4:  Let s be a regular  ESS for some fitness function f.  Then: (a) s 
is an EE under Malthusian and also under linear dynamics; (b) if s E So and f  is 
bilinear, then ESS(f ) =EE(Mf  ) = EE(Lf ) = {s); (c)  if N = 2,  K =  1,  and f  is 
bilinear, then ESS(f  ) =  EE(F)  for all weak compatible dynamics F;  and (d) if f 
is symmetric, then s E EE(F)  for any dynamic F which is weak or order compati- 
ble with  f. 
REMARK  3.4: The symmetry  condition  in Proposition  3.4(d) of course is that 
f(r, s) =f(s,  r), suggesting  team games. Readers acquainted  with the biological 
literature  might  be confused  on this point because Maynard  Smith  refers to the 
single population case (K =  1) as the "the symmetric  case" and to certain 
special cases of K>  1 as "the asymmetric  case."  16 
REMARK  3.5:  I suspect that Proposition 3.4 holds even if the ESS is not 
regular,  but I have not been able to find a proof for part (a) when s  is not 
interior. 
I conclude this section with three counterexamples  that show that ESS is 
neither necessary  nor sufficient  for the dynamic  stability  of a fixed point of a 
compatible  dynamic,  and that ESS and EE do not always  exist. See Friedman 
(1987) for details. 
16 Maynard  Smith applies the term "asymmetric  case" to a single genetic population  whose 
members  sometimes  play  different  "roles"  (e.g., owner  or intruder  in a territorial  contest)  and have 
role-dependent  strategy  sets. The most natural  way to formalize  this idea in the present  framework 
is to write an underlying  general  fitness  function  with K = the number  of possible  roles, and then 
reduce  it (by taking  the expectation  with respect  to role probabilities)  to a single-population  fitness 
function  defined  on role-contingent  strategies.  See Selten (1980)  for a different  formal  approach. 654  DANIEL FRIEDMAN 
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COUNTEREXAMPLE  1 (from  Taylor and Jonker (1978, p. 153)): Let  K =  1 and 
N = 3, with f  bilinear  and represented  by the matrix 
(2  1  5 
A=  5  1  0 
1  4  3 
One  readily confirms that  s = 35  -1  (15, 11,  9)  is  a  NE  point for A,  with 
a = 86/35.  For x = 35 -1  (18,17, 0) we  have f(x,  s) = f(s,  s) = a  and  f(s,  x) = 
35-2  2746 <f(x,  x) =  35-2  2773 so  s  E/-ESS(f). However, one  can show that 
the eigenvalues for DLf(s)  restricted to  the tangent space H(13)  are  A = 
-  2(1 + i101)  SO s E EE(Lf).  Taylor  and Jonker  show that s E EE(Mf).  Hence 
ESS is not necessary  for dynamic  stability.17 
17 The biggest surprise in this counterexample is that even with Malthusian dynamics, stability is 
possible when certain types of mutant invasion are successful (i.e., when the ESS conditions fail). As 
Taylor and Jonker point out, the intuitive explanation is that ESS, which is essentially a negative- 
definiteness property, requires (Malthusian) trajectories to approach a fixed point directly, while the 
correct dynamic stability criterion allows trajectories to spiral in elliptically. An analogous confusion 
arose  40  years  ago  among  economic  theorists  when  Hicks  tried  to  characterize  the  stability of 
multiple-market competitive equilibrium in terms of the negative definiteness  of the gross substitu- 
tion matrix A = ((dqi/dp1)). Paul Samuelson (1948) pointed out that the correct characterization of 
stability  under  tatonnement  dynamics  is  that  A  have  eigenvalues  with  negative  real  parts.  In 
general, negative definiteness  is too strong; but in the symmetric case (e.g.,  no income effects) the 
two characterizations are the same. EVOLUTIONARY GAMES IN ECONOMICS  655 
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COUNTEREXAMPLE 2: Again, let f  be bilinear with K =  1 and N =  3, but now 
set 
-5  34  -29 
A=  -26  -5  311. 
31  -29  -2 
The  example is constructed with the convenient  properties that  s =  (3, 3, 3) E 
NE(f  ) and that average fitness is zero.  It can be  shown that  A  is a negative 
definite  quadratic form  on  the  tangent  space  H(13),  so  s  is  a  regular ESS. 
Nevertheless  order compatible  (not  to mention  weak compatible)  dynamics F 
can  be  constructed  for  which  s 0 EE(F).  Basically  one  computes  the  order 
compatible cones  shown in Figure 7, and notes  that by always picking tangent 
vectors close to the outer edge of the cones, one can intersect each of the lines 
at a point increasingly distant from s, i.e., one  can obtain a dynamic F  whose 
trajectories  spiral  rapidly outwards  from  s.  Hence  ESS  is  not  sufficient  for 
dynamic stability. 
COUNTEREXAMPLE  3  (Sigmund,  et  al.,  reported  in  Zeeman  (1979,  pp. 
483-484)):  Again f  is bilinear and K = 1 but N = 4 and 
(0  1  E  O 
A=(oE  0  0  14 
1  E  O  O 
Consider s =  (4j, 4,  4,  4).  For  1 > E > 0,  {s} =  ESS(f)  =  EE(Lf) =  EE(Mf). 
However,  for  small  E <O,  s  is  a  saddle  point  and  ESS(f)  =  EE(Lf)  = 
EE(Mf)  = 0.  There  is  a  stable  limit cycle with  a  shape  in  S  (here  3-dimen- 
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4.  DISCUSSION 
4.1.  Interpretations  and Extensions 
The results of the last section indicate that NE is a very useful static concept 
for analyzing steady states  of  evolutionary games.  Whether  one  works with  a 
specific dynamic, such as the Malthusian or the linear, or knows only that the 
dynamic is compatible (even just weakly compatible) with a fitness function  f, 
the results of the last section ensure that there is always a nonempty set NE(f) 
of points all of which are steady states and which contain all dynamically stable 
steady states. 
An  important  message  of  the  results  is  that  ESS  has  no  such  general 
usefulness.  There  are special  cases,  as  indicated  in  Proposition  3.4,  in which 
ESS's  (if  they  exist)  will  be  dynamically stable  steady  states  and  therefore 
represent an interesting refinement of NE. However, the counterexamples show 
that in general the ESS property is neither necessary nor sufficient for dynamic 
stability of  order  compatible  (much  less  weak  compatible)  evolutionary pro- 
cesses. 
The  evolutionary  framework  suggests  some  NE  refinements  with  greater 
general  appeal  than  ESS.  Larry Samuelson  (1987)  shows  for  bilinear  K = 2 
discrete time games that convergent evolutionary processes obeying a somewhat 
stronger condition  than  order compatibility will converge  to  perfect  NE,  and 
that even nonconvergent processes will lead to asymptotic extinction of nonra- 
tionalizable strategies. Nachbar (1989) establishes in somewhat greater general- 
ity that  the  NE  refinement  dominance  solvability (and,  in  some  cases,  weak 
dominance  solvability) suffices to  ensure  the  convergence  of  order-compatible 
dynamics. 
Significantly sharper refinements  may not  be  possible.  Given  the  variety of 
economically  plausible  dynamics, it  seems  unreasonable  to  expect  any static 
definition  to  pick out  precisely  the  economically  relevant equilibria. From an 
evolutionary perspective  the  quest  for  the  ideal  (static)  NE  refinement  thus 
appears futile.  A  search for useful  classes  of  learning and imitation dynamics 
seems more promising because  ambiguities vanish regarding the relevant equi- 
librium once the dynamics (and initial conditions) are determined. 
The  formal framework employed  here can be  modified in several ways. For 
example,  I  have  assumed  that  the  evolution  of  the  system  is  everywhere 
governed by a given compatible dynamic F,  so that  s = F(s)  E Z(f,  s).  Instead 
one  could merely require that  s E Z(f,  s),  i.e.,  allow the  learning rule to vary 
over time and state. Such "nondeterministic" or "differential inclusion" dynam- 
ics allow self-intersecting trajectories, but it is reasonable to conjecture that the 
main results will still hold, given the results of Friedman (1979) and Aubin and 
Cellina (1984). 
A more substantial generalization of the present framework allows analysis of 
nonanonymous  strategic interaction. The  idea  is that fitness could  depend  on 
which  agents  employ  the  various  strategies,  and  not  just  on  the  population 
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on the biologists' distinction between monomorphic models (all individuals play 
the  same mixed strategy except for a small subpopulation of  mutants who  all 
deviate to some other mixed strategy) and polymorphic models (all individuals 
play pure strategies which may differ across individuals), Hines regards states as 
distributions of mixed strategies (i.e.,  measures on  S  rather than points in  S). 
He  shows that the  population  mean  evolves under Malthusian dynamics in  a 
manner similar to that of the basic model (in essence  one  replaces the fitness 
matrix A by CA where  C is the population covariance matrix), but that ESS is 
necessary for stability in this state space. 
Schmeidler  (1973)  provides  the  static  elements  for  general  nonanonymous 
evolutionary games: a continuum of agents t E T = [0, 1] and Lebesgue-measur- 
able strategy profiles  x  mapping T into the  N-simplex. The  state space is the 
set of all such strategy profiles and the payoff function is assumed linear in own 
(mixed) strategy and continuous in the state. Masso (1988) employs these  static 
elements together with "memory strategy" dynamics adapted from Smale (1980). 
Both authors focus on existence of NE and emphasize the special "anonymous" 
case (Masso, Assumption A.2, page 61) in which the payoff depends on the state 
x  only through its  mean  JTX.  In  the  anonymous case  the  Schmeidler  payoff 
function and auxiliary function reduce respectively to a fitness function  f  and 
fitness vector  f  as defined  in Section  2.1  above.  Schmeidler  and Masso  each 
show that under the  anonymity assumption any NE  is implementable  in pure 
strategy choices for each player t E T. 
The general nonanonymous model in my view will be useful when the number 
of strategically distinct types of interacting agents is unbounded; otherwise the 
evolutionary  game  framework of  Section  2,  taking  K  as  the  bound  on  the 
number of  types,  seems  adequate.  Infinite-dimensional  state  spaces  can  also 
arise when there are infinitely many pure strategies, as in games of timing; for 
example, see Riley (1979) who also discusses the effects of finite population size 
in biological models. 
4.2.  Applications 
The  applications  to  substantial  questions  in  economics  and  other  social 
sciences  will ultimately measure  the value  of  evolutionary games. Here  I will 
briefly and nonsystematically survey some recent applications related-to  evolu- 
tionary games, and then  suggest some  new areas of application.  Several more 
systematic surveys are now  available.  Hines  (1987)  is  a  relatively recent  and 
mathematically sophisticated summary of the biological ESS literature. Chapter 
9 of van Damme (1987) provides a compact summary of game theoretic  results 
relating  to  ESS  and  an  introduction  to  Malthusian  dynamics. Hofbauer  and 
Sigmund (1988)  is  a  delightful  compendium  of  biological  applications  of  dy- 
namic systems theory, whose  "red thread" is  Malthusian dynamics. A  recent 
brief theoretical survey can be found in Nachbar (1989). 
Conlisk (1980) provides an early evolutionary approach using discrete  time 
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gies,  "optimization" and "imitation," and looks for an equilibrium population 
ratio of these  two strategies where a quadratic loss function for nonoptimizers 
must balance  a constant positive cost to optimization.  The  main result is that 
the fraction of optimizers in the population does not asymptotically converge to 
1 as long as imitation is fitter than optimization when the population is almost 
all  optimizers.  Clearly this  conclusion  would  also  follow  for  any  true  order 
compatible dynamics. 
The  question of whether  an investor should purchase securities  information 
or just rely on  (nearly?) efficient asset prices  has a similar flavor to  Conlisk's 
optimization  vs.  imitation  discussion.  Cornell  and  Roll  (1981)  answer  this 
question  in  terms  of  an  interior  ESS  of  a  model  formally equivalent  to  the 
biologists'  simplest  (K = 1,  N = 2)  static  territorial conflict  model.  They  also 
discuss  biologists'  "asymmetric" models  as  a  device  to  explain  the  seniority 
system in hierarchical organizations. 
James Friedman and Robert Rosenthal  (1986) introduce migration dynamics 
for bilinear  K =  2 games with no  externalities,  in order to  explain  deviations 
from  NE  observed  in  laboratory  oligopolies  and  similar  experiments.  For 
reasons  discussed in Example 2.5 above, the  NE  of  their payoff functions are 
not typically dynamic equilibria. 
Schofield (e.g., 1978) studies dynamic games of social choice, inspired more by 
nontatonnement processes than by evolutionary considerations. The idea is that 
at each point of policy space individual preferences  and the choice  rules (e.g., 
majority vote)  define  policy  increments  that  are  feasible  and  preferred  by  a 
relevant coalition (e.g., a majority); such increments form a cone in the tangent 
space at that point. Schofield shows that piecewise  smooth paths (called  "opti- 
mizing" curves for some reason) whose tangent vector at each point lies in the 
cone  need  not  converge.  Indeed,  given a condition  called  "null dual" that  is 
often satisfied, optimizing curves exist between most pairs of points so cycles are 
very common. By contrast, Smale (1976) and followers (e.g.,  Friedman (1979)) 
obtain  quite  strong convergence  results  for  cone  field  dynamics in  exchange 
economies. 
Recently  several  authors  have  begun  to  model  dynamic  games  with  an 
evolutionary perspective  on  individual (not  population)  choice.  Skyrms (1986) 
discusses  some  philosophical  issues  regarding rationality in games,  and intro- 
duces  a  virtual  "deliberational  dynamic" (describing  the  adjustment  of  the 
mixed strategy contemplated by an individual) that seems formally equivalent to 
the linear dynamic. Binmore (1987/88)  points out several other problems with 
rationality in  the  static  specification  of  games; he  emphasizes  extensive-form 
games of imperfect information but some of the problems also arise in standard 
normal-form games with several NE.  He  suggests a dynamic resolution to the 
problems,  and  distinguishes  between  "eductive"  processes  (reminiscent  of 
Skyrms) and "evolutive" processes  in which some  sort of selection  mechanism 
operates  on  boundedly-rational automated  players. Possibly the  general  non- 
anonymous model sketched above will be useful in pursuing the individualistic 
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Crawford (1989) examines laboratory games in which subjects are motivated 
to match the  minimum or median contribution towards a public good (so  the 
payoff  is  not  bilinear;  these  are  "playing  the  field"  fitness  functions).  He 
sketches  an adaptive model  inspired by ESS  literature (evidently  a stochastic 
version of the  linear dynamic) that seems  capable of  explaining the  data. The 
paper  more  generally  shows  the  promise  of  laboratory  experiments  as  an 
empirical tool for finding specific evolutionary dynamics of economic interest. 
A computerized tournament in which several game theorists submitted auto- 
mated strategies for the repeated  prisoners' dilemma, reported in Axelrod and 
Hamilton (1981), spawned an extensive and fascinating body of literature. I will 
not attempt a survey; see Axelrod and Dion (1988). Marks (1989) also contains a 
recent review that draws connections to the Holland (1980) "genetic algorithm." 
The  tournament  does  not  fit  neatly  into  the  present  framework since  it  in- 
volves a supergame viz.,  nonanonymous repeated  encounters  in the  Prisoner's 
Dilemma.  However,  Hirshleifer  and  Martinez-Coll  (1987)  re-express  this  su- 
pergame as an evolutionary game and show that "tit-for-tat" is not as robust a 
strategy as some authors have claimed. 
Arthur (1989)  employs  a stochastic version  of  Malthusian dynamics arising 
from a learning algorithm rather than from the genetic  mechanism. He  shows 
that the limit points must be NE.  Boyd and Richerson (1985) explore a variety 
of models that contrast and often combine genetic and social selection  mecha- 
nisms.  Inasmuch  as  economists  regard  a  single  generation  of  30  years  as 
"long-run" or "very long-run," the time scales in the latter article are exceed- 
ingly long for economic applications. 
New  potential  economic  applications  of  (population)  evolutionary  games 
include monetary theory, industrial organization, and international economics."8 
A  recurrent question  in  the  first field  is  how  a  medium  of  exchange  might 
emerge in a laissez-faire barter economy with transactions costs-e.g.,  see Jones 
(1976) and the recent survey by Cowen and Kroszner (1987). It seems natural to 
address  this  question  in  terms  of  an  evolutionary game  with  pure  strategies 
representing  an  agent's willingness  to  accept  specific goods  he  does  not  ulti- 
mately wish to hold; one  looks for the  presence  of corner EE  and absence  of 
interior EE to justify a single medium of exchange.19 
In industrial organization, one might study the "fitness" of alternative strate- 
gies such as independent  entry, franchising, and merger under specific assump- 
tions  regarding  product  pricing.20 One  might  also  usefully  consider  K = 2 
models  for worker and firm populations,  in which  one  could  consider  issues 
regarding unionization,  apprenticeship vs. other  methods  of  acquiring specific 
18 This  list  of  topics  is  certainly not  exhaustive.  For  example,  the  perspectives  in  Hirshleifer 
(1977) indicate that the economics of law is a natural area for applied models of evolutionary games. 
19 I was pleased to discover recently that Marimon, McGrattan, and Sargent (1989) take just such 
an approach to the issue, using dynamics based on Holland's genetic  and classifier algorithms. 
20 It might be  amusing to  model  Porter's (1980) popular "generic competitive  strategies" (cost 
leadership, differentiation, and focus) in an evolutionary game and see  whether  an interior EE  is 
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skills, and compensation  methods.  For instance, with regard to  the  last issue, 
one  wonders whether  Weitzman's (1984) proposed  share economy  is dynami- 
cally stable, given workers' incentive not to dilute their ownership shares; one 
could use an evolutionary model to test the conjecture that firms which promise 
not to dilute might successfully invade an industry of Weitzmanian firms. 
In international economics, one could consider the sectoral investment choices 
of  entrepreneurs  in  autarky as  a  K=  1  model.  Then,  for  n  countries,  one 
obtains a K = n evolutionary model by coupling the autarky models under some 
(not necessarily free) trading regime. Such a model may be useful for discussing 
the dynamic impact of trade and capital restrictions on sectoral investment and 
output. 
Another potentially fruitful avenue of investigation can be taken in conjunc- 
tion with applications such as those just described or on its own: the systematic 
exploration of  specific learning and imitation rules and their dynamic implica- 
tions. 
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APPENDIX 
A. 1.  Notation and Definitions 
Rn  denotes  Euclidean  space  of  finite  dimension  n > 1 with  the  usual  basis  ell...Ie  ,  where 
e' = (0, . . ., 1, . . .0, ), the  1 being in the ith place. Vectors, denoted  x, v, e', etc., are column vectors 
for  purposes  of  matrix calculations  but  usually  are written  as  row vectors  as  above  to  simplify 
typography. The  symbol  =  means  "is defined  as." For vectors or scalars x1,...  I xm  and  y,  the 
notation  Ik refers to  replacement  of  the  kth  component;  e.g.,  if  x =  (x1I...,xm),  then  XlkY  = 
(x1 .  . .,  xk-i  y,  xk+.  x1m).  X0  denotes the (relative) interior of a set  XcRn.  For I a finite set, 
#I  is the number of elements of  I. 
The  usual  inner product  is  denoted  by  a  dot,  i.e.,  x  Y  y  EIXi  y1  for  x =(x1,xn)  and 
Y  =  (Y1 .  y  .  ) E Rn.  H(x,  a):=  {v E Rn:  v  x = a) is the (n -  1 dimensional)  hyperplane with nor- 
mal  x E Rn  translated  from  the  origin  On  = (...,  0)  along  x  for  the  distance  a E R1.  The 
corresponding  closed  and  open  positive  half-spaces  are  H+(x,  a) := {v E Rn:  v  x  >  a)  and 
H?(x,  a) :=  {v E Rn:  v  x > a). Negative  half-spaces  H_  are analogously defined.  H(x):=  H(x, 0) 
and  similarly for  the  half-spaces.  The  positive orthant  thus  is  R+:= n  U  =lH+(e'),  and  the  unit 
simplex is  A = H(1,  1) n R  n,  where 1n = (1.  1) E Rn  is the  diagonal vector. 
For s EA,  let  I(s)  = {i = 1.  N: s' >  01  and F(s):=  {i: s' = 0), and let  RI(S) be the subspace of 
RN spanned by {e': i E I(s)).  Then  s  is in the subsimplex  AI(S)  H(lN,  1)  +  R  Its tangent space 
is H(lN)  n R (s). The order-cone  for x E Rn is 
C(x) := { y E Rn:  yJ < y  iff xj < x, for i, j =1.  n}. 
Note  for later reference  that  y E  C(x)  iff x E  C(y),  and in particular On  Ee C(1n)  =  {yln:  y E R'}. 
A  careful inspection  of  the  definitions in the  body of  the  paper discloses  that a differentiable 
function  F:  S -*  RNK  is  a  dynamic which  is  order  compatible  with  the  fitness  function  f  iff 
Fk(S)  E  C( fk(s))  n H(lN)  n RI(Sk)  for all s E S and all k. Hence  define the order compatible cone 
for f  at s 
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Likewise, G  is an order compatible  predynamic if  Gk(S)  E  C(fk(s))  n H(sk)  n RI(Sk)  so the latter 
expression defines the order compatible  predynamics cone for f at s,  Zk  (f,  s). For weak compatibil- 
ity, one  replaces  C(f k(s))  by H+(f  k(s))  when  fk(S)  a5l k,  and by  ON  otherwise.  The  resulting 
cones  of  weak compatible  dynamics and predynamics tangent vectors  are denoted  ZC  and  Zp 
respectively. 
Given a fitness function f,  define the linear dynamic Lf:  S -*  RNK  by Lf (s)  D(1s)(f(s)  -  a(s)), 
where a(s) E RKN  has (all N of) its k components  equal  to (#I(sk))  -El  E  E  (Sk) f  k(e'  s), the simple 
average  fitness  of  nonextinct  population  k  strategies.  Recall  ls  has  zero  components  wherever 
sk  =  0  with  unit  components  elsewhere.  Obviously Lf  is  order  compatible  with  f  and  satisfies 
admissibility conditions  (a)  and  (b).  However,  Lf  may be  discontinuous  on  the  boundaries  of 
(sub)simplicies, so it is a slight abuse of terminology to call it a dynamic. Care is taken in the proofs 
involving Lf  to ensure that they remain valid. 
Given a fitness function f,  define the Malthusian dynamic Mf: S -  RNK  by Mf(s)  D(sXf(s)  - 
a*(s)),  where  a*(s) E RKN  has its k-components (all  N  of them) equal to f  k(Sk,  s)  =  Eskfk(e',  s), 
the population-weighted  average fitness of population  k  strategies. It is immediate that s *(f(s)- 
a*(s)) = 0 so f(s)  -  a*(s)  is indeed a predynamic which is order-compatible rwith  f.  If f  is bilinear, 
then  Mf will specify differential equations of degree 3. 
A. 2.  Proofs 
Before presenting proofs of the Propositions, I sketch the analysis behind Example 1 and Figure 
1 for readers who are interested. The center point and the four corner points are clearly the only 
solutions to 0 = p = 4 in equations (2.2) and (2.3). Summarizing the equations  as (p, 4) =  F(p,  q), 
one  readily calculates the Jacobian 
DF  )  (1 
- 
12  p)(  1-  2q)  -2  p(l1-p)  )  DF(p,  q)  - 
2q(l 
-  q)  (1 -  2q)(2p  -1) 
Hence,  at the corners (p,  q = 0 or 1) we have 
DF(p,q)  =  +(  1  0) 
which implies that these  are all saddle points. At the center point we have 
DF(2,)t 
2 
whose eigenvalues are purely imaginary at  +i/2,  so up to first order the trajectories are (counter- 
clockwise) concentric circles of period 4wr.  The higher order terms could stabilize or destabilize this 
fixed point, so further analysis is required. One employs new variables that translate the fixed point 
to  the  origin,  x =p  -  2,  Y  =q  -  2,  and  re-expresses  equations  (2.2)-(2.3)  as  x =X(x,  y):= 
-2y(  -x2)  and  y =  Y(x, y) :=  2x(+y2).  Observe  that  dx/d(-t)  =  -X(x,  y) =X(x,  -y)  and 
dy/d(-  t) =  -Y(x,  y) =  -Y(x,  -y).  Hence  for  initial  conditions  x(0) = x0 > 0  and  y(0) = 0,  the 
solution  curve satisfies  x(t)  =x(-t)  and  y(t)  =  -y(-t)  for all  t E R.  In particular, y(to) = 0 for 
some smallest to > 0 (for x0 small, to = 2wr)  by the first order approximation, so the solution curve is 
a closed loop of period 2to which has x = 0 as an axis of symmetry. Similarly, y = 0 is also an axis of 
symmetry, and  a  simple  argument shows  that  x =  y  and  x =  -y  are  further axes of  symmetry. 
Alternatively,  one  observes  that  the  function  H(p,  q) =pq(1  -p)(1  -  q)  is  constant  on  solution 
curves  and  has  closed  isoquants.  Consequently  the  phase  portrait  is  the  same  (up  to  time 
reparameterization)  as  the  isoquant  map.  Re-expressing  the  equations  in  the  polar  coordinates 
x = rcos 0,  y = r sin 0, one  finds that  r = 1/2r3  sin 40  and 0 = 1/2  -  r2(1 -  cos40),  which yield the 
squarish trajectories of Figure 1. 
REMARK A.1:  It is not  always the  case  that the order cone  of  a vector lies in its own positive 
half-space. For instance, take x = (1, 2, 3) so for y = ( -  3, -  2, -  1) we have y E  C(x)  but y e H+(x). 
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LEMMA A.1:  For N >  2, let x, y c  H(lN)  and y E C(x).  Then x  y > 0  unless x = y  =  ON 
PROOF: Define lix II:= max{  1x,1:  i = 1,...,  N}-the  "sup norm,"  and set U:={x  E RN:  llxii =  1} 
-the  unit  vectors.  Let  v =  (1,2,...,N)  and  Z:=  C(V) n H(N)  n U.  Inspection  of  the  extreme 
points of  Z  discloses  that inf{x  y:  x, y c  Z}  is achieved for x  and  y  at the  "diagonally opposite 
corners," viz, 
X*=(  1,Nl1.N-1)  and  Y  (  N-1  N-1') 
But 
2  N-2  N 
X* Y=N-  1  (N-1)  (N  -1 
Note  that for any x E RN, the cone  C(x)  is isometric to C(v)  (possibly with N  replaced by n < N) 
so  the  inequality  is  quite  general.  Indeed,  for  x, y  in  H(l N),  if  x = ON  and  y 0  ON,  then 
x  y >  iIxi  *  IIYIIN/(N-1)2  > 0.  If  X = ON  then C(x) = {a1N:  a C R1} so Y  =  1N  for a such that 
O  =  1-N  Y =  alNl  1N = a N, i.e.,  a = 0 and  Y = ON.  Since  y  C(x)  iff x E  C(y),  we  also conclude 
that  y = ON  implies  x =  ON.  Hence  either  x = ON  and  x = y  =  ON,  or else  x  /  ON  and x  y > 0. 
REMARK A.2:  The  same conclusion  can be  established  by essentially  the  same  argument when 
x, y a H(w)  n RI)  for given  w c  Sk. One  takes  a  w-weighted sup norm (that  is, w, Ix, I replaces 
ix, I) and replaces  x * and y * by appropriate functions of  w. 
PROPOSITION  3.1:  For every  fitness function f,  for every state s in S, and for k-1,...,K,  the order 
compatible cones Zkc f, s) for dynamics and Zkp f, s) for predynamics are subsets of the correspond- 
ing weak compatible cones Z;  W(f, s)  and ZWPff,  s). 
PROOF:  If N = 1, the state space is a singleton and the cones  are all the zero vector. For given 
N >  2, fix f,  s, and k. Set  y =fk(s)  and let  x  OZHkc(f,  s) = C(y)  n H(ON) nRI(sk).  If  X =  ON  then 
(by definition of order-cones) it must be the case that  y = alk;  hence  x c  Zk  (f,  s).  On the other 
hand, if x  k  ON  the lemma implies that x c  Ho  so again x c  Zkc4(f,  s). This establishes the desired 
conclusion  for dynamic cones.  For predynamics cones  one  repeats  the  same  argument using the 
extension of the lemma noted in Remark A.2 with w = s  Q.E.D. 
PROPOSITION  3.2:  Let the dynamic F be weak compatible with the fitness function f.  Alternatively, 
let the predynamic G be weak compatible with f  and let F(s)  = D(s)G(s).  In either case,  all Nash 
equilibria are fixed points and all interior fixed points are Nash equilibria, i.e.,  NE(f)  c FP(F)  and 
NE(f)nSo=FP(F)nSO. 
PROOF:  Let  s a NE(f)  and fix  k.  By Remark 2.5 a  :=f  k(Sk,  S)  f  k(e,  s)  for all  i c  I(Sk),  so 
f k(S)  = 
alsk  and consequently Fk(s)  ON.  Alternatively, if the predynamic G  is weak compatible, 
then  the  relevant  cone  is  Zk  (f,s)-C(0  )  H(sk)  =(01  In  either  case  we  conclude  that 
s c  FP(F). 
For the last part of the proof, let  s E FP(F)  n  So. Then  {ON)  a  C(fk(s)  E  H(l9  for each  k by 
the  compatibility condition  for F.  The  properties of order cones  noted  after their definition  now 
imply f k(S)  =  Y1N  for some y c  R1. Alternatively if G is compatible, then ON  =  Fk(s)  =  D(sk)Gk(s) 
since s e FP(F),  and so  ON  = Gk(s)  since D(sk)  is invertible for s a  So. But then  fk(5)  E  C(ON) So 
again  f  k(S)  =  Y1N.  Thus in either case we have  fk(eI,  s) = y  =fk(sk,  s)  for all i =  1..N.  Since 
this is true for each k =  1.  K, we conclude from Remark 2.5 that s c  NE(f).  Q.E.D. 
PROPOSITION  3.3:  Let the dynamic F be weak compatible with the fitness function f,  or alternatively 
let F(s)  = D(s)G(s)  and  let  G  be a predynamic which is  weak compatible with f.  Then all stable 
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PROOF: Let  s e EE(F).  Since  s e  FP(F),  the  last  argument  in  Proposition  3.2  tells  us  that 
f k(e', s) = a  for all i E I(sk)  for some  a  E R1. Suppose  3 := max  {f k(e',  s): i=  1.  N)  > a.  Then 
set  J,'=  {i:  f  k(e,  s) = ,3) and J  {i:  f k(e',  s) <,3)  D I(Sk).  Thus 
C  = {r e S: fk(e',  r)  >fk(el,  r)  Vj eJ,  Vi cJ'} 
is a cone  in S, which (since f  is continuous) is an open neighborhood of  s e  S. For r e  C n SO we 
have  Fik(r)  > FJ(r)  for all  i EJ'  and j EJ  so  E  >  0>  L  if  F  is  compatible,  or 
alternatively YE  ,(lhrl)>  0  if  G  is  compatible.  Hence  YE, yr  (or  alternatively  T  rr/)  is  a 
positive increasing function of time for all r(O) E C n SO. Since this function is 0 at r = s, it follows 
that s  is not stable, i.e. s i  EE(F).  Consequently, the supposition that ,3 > a  is false. We conclude 
that 
N 
f(x,s)=  Exjf(e',s)<aEx,=a=  E  Skf(et,  s)  = f  (Sk, S), 
i.e., s E NE(f  Q.ED. 
PROPOSITION  3.4:  Let s be a regular ESS for some fitness function f.  Then: (a)  s is an EE under 
Malthusian and also under linear dynamics; (b)  if s e SO and f  is bilinear then ESS(f)  =  EE(Mf)  = 
EE(Lf ) = {s); (c)  if N = 2,  K = 1,  and f  is bilinear, then ESS(f  ) = EE(F)  for  all  weak or order 
compatible dynamics F; and (d)  if f is symmetric, then s e EE(F)  for any dynamic F which is weak or 
order compatible with f. 
PROOF: First suppose  s e  ESS(f)  n SO, and define  the function  V: S -> R1 by V(r) =  (r -s) 
(r -  s). Clearly V is minimized (strictly) on S at s, so it will follow that s E EE(L  ) if one can show 
that V<  0 on S, i.e., that V is a Liapunov function for L  (cf. Hirsch and Smale, {heorem  9.3.1, for 
instance). Let  A  Df`(s). Thus, the NK x NK  matrix A has entries 
d 
alj  kf(e,r 
dJ  r =s 
For r ES,  let  ak(r)  =  1N  fk(r)/1N  N = N-  2f k(e', r)  and let  a(r):=  (al(r)1N,  ...  ak(r)1N)  E 
RNK.  Then up to first order for r near s  we have r = Lf (r)  = Ar -  a(r),  and 
V(r)  = (r-s)  *z  r  (r-s)  *  (Ar  -  a(r))  = (r-s)  *  Ar = (r-s)  *  A(r-s). 
The last two equalities use the facts that rk  .  1N=  1 =  5k.  1N  (since s and r are in the simplex) and 
As = a(s)  (since s E FP(Lf ) by Proposition 3.1). Since s E NE(f  ) the initial hypothesis together with 
Remark 2.5 tells us that condition (b) of the definition of ESS holds for each  k,  so rAs = sAs  and 
rAr < sAr  for all  r # s E S.  Consequently,  V(r)  = rAr -  rAs -  sAr + sAs = rAr -  sAr < 0,  so  s E 
EE(Lf).  This  argument can  be  extended  as  in Taylor and  Jonker (1978)  to  establish  the  same 
conclusion  if  s  is  a  regular, noninterior  ESS.  That  is,  by renumbering so  that  entries  iEI(s  k) 
appear first, one  can write each block  Ak  as an upper block triangular matrix whose  lower right 
block is diagonal with negative entries and whose upper right block can be shown negative definite 
by use of the same Liapunov function employed in the proof above. 
As for Mf,  the proof of Zeeman  (1980), or Taylor and Jonker (1978), for the case  K =  1 can be 
directly  extended  to  the  case  K>  1: one  shows  in  essence  that  V(r)  =  K 
I yNISk  log r/k  is  a 
Liapunov  function  under  Malthusian  dynamics if  s  is  an  ESS.  This  establishes  part (a)  of  the 
Proposition. Note  that the Liapunov functions are defined on all of  So  if s (E  S0 n ESS(f  ) and the 
"first order  approximations" in  the  previous  paragraph are  exact  if  f  is  bilinear.  Hence  using 
Theorem  9.3.2  of  Hirsch  and  Smale  one  can  show  that  there  is  no  other  point  in  EE(Mf)  or 
EE(Lf ) in this case, so (using part (a) of the Proposition) part (b) follows. 
When  N=  2 the  simplexes  Sk  are  1-dimensional for each  k,  so weak and order compatibility 
coincide. When  K =  1 also, the function  s(p)  = peI +  (1 - p)e2  defines an isomorphism between  s 664  DANIEL  FRIEDMAN 
in S and p  in [0, 1]. If f  is bilinear in this case then it has the matrix representation (a,),  i, j = 1, 2. 
Define  a =  a12  -  a22  and b = a2l  -  all,  and set  p* = a/(a  + b). It is well known that  ESS(f)  and 
EE(Mf ) are always the same subset Q of {s(p*), el, e2}, where  Q depends on the signs of  a and b 
as  indicated  in  Figure  6; this  result  can  be  easily verified  for  arbitrary compatible  F  by direct 
calculation of the fitness functions at s(p). 
Suppose  finally that f  is symmetric and  s  is a given regular ESS. Now  f  must be bilinear, so 
f(s)  =As.  Since  fk  is independent  of  rm for m # k, it must also be independent  of  st  for m #  k. 
Thus  A  is a symmetric block diagonal matrix. The  argument in the  first paragraph of  this proof 
establishes that A  is negative definite on  H(1N)K.  For V(r):=  -  'rAr we have 
Lf(r)=Lf(r-s)=A(r-s)-a(r-s)=A(r-s)=  -grad  V(r-s), 
i.e.,  W(r)  V(r -  s) is a potential  function for Lf . Consequently, by Theorem  9.4.3 of Hirsch and 
Smale, the trajectories of linear dynamics cross the level surfaces of  W(r) orthogonally, with W < 0. 
If F  is weak compatible with f,  then F(r)  Lf (r) > 0 so W is a Liapunov function for any weak (or, 
by Proposition 3.1, any order) compatible dynamics F, and therefore s E EE(F).  Q.E.D. 
Details  for counterexample 2: Figure 7 shows the cones  of (admissible and) compatible tangent 
vectors for f  projected on the xl  - x2  plane. On the lines FW(x)  = F(x)  the cone is a single ray; e.g., 
at the point labelled  x  we have F3(x) > F2(x)  =  F1(x) since at that point e3Ax > e2Ax = e1Ax. Since 
0Fj  -  O by  admissibility, we  must  have  F1(x) =F2(x)  =  -  'F3(x)  <0,  giving  the  indicated  ray. 
Similarly one defines the cones at points such as x  on the other lines defined by e Ax = e'Ax,  i  j. 
Between  such lines  the  cone  is an open  2-dimensional  cone  bounded  by the  rays defined  at the 
adjacent lines, e.g., at the point labelled  y the cone is bounded by the rays obtained from x  and x. 
For x E S, e'Ax > e2Ax as 
-5x1  + 34x2 -  29(1-x1-x2)  >-26x,-5x2  + 31(1-x1-x2) 
as  13x,+7x2>20/3, 
so the line F1(x) =  F2(x) passes through s =  (3, 3,  3)  and has slope (after projection into the xl  -x2 
plane) of  -  13/7  -  1.86. Similarly, the lines  FW(x)  = F3(x)  and F2(x) = F3(x)  also pass through s 
and have slopes 37/50  = 0.74 and 50/43  = 1.16 respectively. 
Evidently,  by  always picking  tangent  vectors  close  to  the  outer  edge  of  the  cones,  one  can 
intersect each of these lines at a point increasingly distant from s, i.e., one can obtain a compatible 
dynamic  F  whose  trajectories  spiral  rapidly  outwards  from  s.  Specifically,  one  can  choose  a 
partition of unity (see,  e.g. Rudin (1966, pg. 40)) subordinate to the cover of  S consisting of the six 
open regions bounded by the lines  F' = F'  together with open  epsilon neighborhoods of the lines. 
This partition of unity can be used to piece together local dynamics which take on the value of Lf  at 
the nearest point on the clockwise boundary line in the regions, and take on the value of  Lf  at the 
nearest point on the line in the neighborhoods of the  F' = F'  lines. For epsilon  sufficiently small, 
such a dynamic will be arbitrarily  close to the unstable dynamic whose trajectories have tangents at 
the outer edge of the cones. 
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